Polity
Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties
DPSP vs Fundamental Rights: Conflict and Harmony
Part III vs Part IV for CGPSC: key differences, Champakam to Minerva Mills, Article 31C, the 2024 Article 39(b) ruling and harmonious construction.
Prerequisites
- Directive Principles: Features and Classification — the articles this page sets against Part III, especially 39(b) and (c).
- Overview: Articles 12 to 35 — Art 13, the Right to Property and the 44th Amendment.
- Preamble and Salient Features — where the basic structure doctrine is introduced.
The Hook: A Zamindar, a Tribal Tenant and the Constitution
Connect
In the 1950s, land in the Chhattisgarh plains was still held by malguzars and zamindars, while many cultivators, a large share of them tribal, worked it as tenants. The new State wanted to redistribute that land (Art 39(b), (c)). The landholders went to court under the Right to Property (Art 19(1)(f) and Art 31).
One side held a directive the State was told to follow. The other held a right the courts were told to enforce. When Part IV asks the State to do something that Part III forbids, which part wins? India took about thirty years, and several constitutional amendments, to settle the answer.
Why it matters: This is one of the most repeated Mains questions in Indian polity (“conflict between FR and DPSP”, “harmony and balance”). Prelims asks the chronology of cases and amendments and what Art 31C protects.
Key Differences
| Basis | Fundamental Rights (Part III) | Directive Principles (Part IV) |
|---|---|---|
| Articles | 12–35 | 36–51 |
| Source | Largely the US Bill of Rights | Irish Constitution |
| Nature | Mostly negative: restrain the State | Positive: instruct the State to act |
| Justiciability | Justiciable: enforceable under Arts 32 and 226 | Non-justiciable (Art 37) |
| Democracy | Establish political democracy | Establish social and economic democracy |
| Focus | Individual welfare | Community welfare |
| Legislation needed? | Self-executing: no law needed to enjoy them | Need legislation to take effect |
| Violation | A law violating them can be declared void (Art 13) | A law violating them cannot be struck down for that reason |
| Sanction | Legal | Moral and political (the electorate) |
| Emergency | Can be suspended (except Arts 20 and 21) | Not relevant: they are never “enforced” anyway |
Complementary, not opposed
Fundamental Rights protect liberty now; Directive Principles describe the equal society in which that liberty becomes meaningful. A landless labourer has the freedom of speech, but Art 39 and Art 41 are what give him a livelihood worth speaking about.
The Conflict: From Supremacy of Rights to Harmony
timeline
title FR vs DPSP: cases and amendments
1951 : Champakam Dorairajan - FR prevail, DPSP subsidiary
: 1st Amendment - Arts 15(4), 31A, 31B, Ninth Schedule
1967 : Golaknath - Parliament cannot amend FR
1971 : 24th Amendment - Art 13(4), Art 368 amended
: 25th Amendment - Art 31C for Arts 39(b), (c)
1973 : Kesavananda Bharati - basic structure, part of 31C struck down
1976 : 42nd Amendment - 31C extended to all DPSP
1980 : Minerva Mills - extension struck down, harmony is basic structure
2024 : Property Owners Association - 31C survives, 39(b) read narrowly1. State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951)
- The Supreme Court struck down the Madras communal G.O. that reserved college seats by community, because it violated Art 29(2).
- It held that Directive Principles must conform to and run as subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights.
- Response: the 1st Amendment (1951) added Art 15(4), plus Arts 31A and 31B (Ninth Schedule) to protect land reform laws.
2. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)
- Held that Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights to implement Directive Principles, because a constitutional amendment is a “law” under Art 13.
- Response: the 24th Amendment (1971) declared that Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, including Part III (Art 13(4) and Art 368).
3. The 25th Amendment (1971): Article 31C
Art 31C provided two things:
- A law giving effect to Art 39(b) or (c) shall not be void on the ground that it violates Art 14 or Art 19 (originally also Art 31).
- A law containing a declaration that it gives effect to such a policy shall not be questioned in any court on the ground that it does not do so.
4. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
- 13-judge bench, 7:6. Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights, but not the basic structure of the Constitution.
- On Art 31C: the first part was upheld; the second part (ouster of judicial review through a declaration) was struck down, because judicial review is part of the basic structure.
5. The 42nd Amendment (1976)
- Extended Art 31C’s protection to laws implementing any Directive Principle, not just Art 39(b) and (c).
- This made all of Part IV superior to Arts 14 and 19.
6. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)
Minerva Mills (1980): the key holding
- The Supreme Court struck down the 42nd Amendment’s extension of Art 31C to all directives.
- It held that the Constitution rests on the balance between Part III and Part IV. Giving absolute primacy to one over the other disturbs the harmony of the Constitution.
- Harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is an essential feature of the basic structure.
- The goals of Part IV must be achieved without abrogating the means provided by Part III.
7. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024)
A nine-judge bench decided two questions:
| Question | Holding |
|---|---|
| Does Art 31C survive after Minerva Mills? | Yes, unanimously. Art 31C, in the form upheld in Kesavananda (protecting laws under Art 39(b) and (c)), continues to exist |
| Is every privately owned resource a “material resource of the community” under Art 39(b)? | No (8:1 majority). The Court rejected the broad view, taken by Justice Krishna Iyer in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) and followed in Sanjeev Coke (1983), that all private property falls within Art 39(b). Whether a particular private resource qualifies depends on factors such as its nature and its impact on the community |
The majority opinion was written by CJI D.Y. Chandrachud; Justice B.V. Nagarathna partly concurred and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia dissented on the Art 39(b) question.
The Present Position
| Principle | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Fundamental Rights generally prevail | A law violating Part III is void even if it implements a directive, unless protected by Art 31C |
| Art 31C (Kesavananda form) | Laws giving effect to Art 39(b) and (c) cannot be challenged under Arts 14 and 19 |
| Amendment power | Parliament can amend Part III to implement Part IV, but not the basic structure |
| Harmonious construction | Courts read Part III and Part IV together and avoid conflict where possible |
| DPSP as a test of reasonableness | A restriction on a Fundamental Right that furthers a directive is more likely to be reasonable under Art 19 |
Directives that courts have read into Fundamental Rights
| Directive | Read into | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Art 39A (legal aid) | Art 21 | M.H. Hoskot (1978), Hussainara Khatoon (1979): free legal aid is part of a fair procedure |
| Art 39(d) (equal pay) | Arts 14, 16 | Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) |
| Art 45 (education) | Art 21, then Art 21A | Unni Krishnan (1993), then the 86th Amendment (2002) |
| Art 47 (public health) | Art 21 | Right to health and medical care under Art 21 |
| Art 48A (environment) | Art 21 | Right to a clean environment under Art 21 |
| Art 48 (cattle) | Art 19(6) | State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005): a total ban on slaughter of cow progeny is a reasonable restriction |
| Art 47 (prohibition) | Art 19(1)(g) | Khoday Distilleries (1995): no Fundamental Right to trade in intoxicating liquor |
Chhattisgarh angle
- Land reform: Chhattisgarh inherited Madhya Pradesh’s land ceiling and land revenue laws. Protection of tribal land against transfer to non-tribals, a mix of Art 46 and the restriction in Art 19(5), is a standing example of Part IV guiding a limit on Part III.
- Reservation: the state’s 2012 decision to raise total reservation to 58% (Art 46 goals) was set aside by the High Court in September 2022 for breaching the 50% norm under Arts 14–16, and the Supreme Court stayed that order in May 2023. See Right to Equality and Freedom and check the current status before quoting it.
- Mining vs forests: debates over coal blocks in the Hasdeo Arand forests set Art 19(1)(g) and development goals against Art 48A and the rights of Gram Sabhas. Use this as an illustration of balancing, without taking a side.
Memory Tricks
Case chain: 'Champ Gola Kesav Minerva' (51, 67, 73, 80)
Champakam 1951 (DPSP subsidiary) → Golaknath 1967 (no amending FR) → Kesavananda 1973 (amend, but not the basic structure) → Minerva 1980 (balance is basic structure).
Each case is followed by a reply amendment: 1st, 24th + 25th, 42nd (struck down in Minerva).
Art 31C in one line: 'B-C protects against 14-19'
Laws for Art 39 (b) and (c) are safe from challenge under Arts 14 and 19. Nothing more after Minerva Mills.
Don’t Confuse
| This | vs | That |
|---|---|---|
| 25th Amendment (1971) — inserted Art 31C for 39(b), (c) | vs | 42nd Amendment (1976) — extended 31C to all DPSP (struck down) |
| Kesavananda (1973) — struck down the judicial-review ouster in 31C | vs | Minerva Mills (1980) — struck down the extension of 31C |
| Golaknath (1967) — FR cannot be amended | vs | 24th Amendment (1971) — Parliament can amend FR |
| Art 31B — Ninth Schedule laws (1st Amendment) | vs | Art 31C — laws for 39(b), (c) (25th Amendment) |
| Ranganatha Reddy (1977) — majority did not adopt Krishna Iyer’s broad view | vs | Sanjeev Coke (1983) — followed Krishna Iyer’s view; overruled in effect in 2024 |
Common Mistakes
MCQ traps
- “Minerva Mills struck down Article 31C.” Wrong. It struck down only the 42nd Amendment’s extension. The original 31C survives, as the Court confirmed in 2024.
- “Kesavananda upheld the whole of Article 31C.” Wrong. The clause barring courts from examining the declaration was struck down.
- “Directive Principles prevail over Fundamental Rights since 1976.” Wrong. That was the effect of the 42nd Amendment, undone in 1980.
- “Art 31C protects against Article 21.” Wrong. It protects only against Arts 14 and 19.
- “The 2024 ruling held that private property can never be a material resource of the community.” Wrong. It held that not all private property is; some private resources may qualify.
- “Directive Principles can be suspended during an emergency.” The question is meaningless: they are never enforceable by courts. Only Part III is suspended under Arts 358–359.
Practice
All questions below are original practice questions written in CGPSC style. They are not previous-year questions.
Level 1: Foundation
- In which case did the Supreme Court hold that harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is part of the basic structure?
- Article 31C was inserted by the ______ Amendment Act, ______.
- Which two Fundamental Rights cannot be used to challenge a law protected by Article 31C?
Answers
- Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980).
- 25th Amendment Act, 1971.
- Article 14 and Article 19.
Level 2: Prelims MCQs
Q1. Consider the following statements about Article 31C:
- It was inserted by the 25th Amendment Act, 1971.
- In Kesavananda Bharati, the Supreme Court struck down the provision that a declaration in the law could not be questioned in court.
- In Minerva Mills, the Supreme Court struck down Article 31C in its entirety.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 only
- (b) 1 and 2 only
- (c) 2 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation
(b) 1 and 2 only. Art 31C came with the 25th Amendment (1971). Kesavananda (1973) struck down its second part, which ousted judicial review. Minerva Mills (1980) struck down only the 42nd Amendment’s extension of 31C to all directives. In 2024 a nine-judge bench confirmed that 31C, in its Kesavananda form, still exists.
Q2. Arrange the following in chronological order:
- Golaknath v. State of Punjab
- Minerva Mills v. Union of India
- State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan
- Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
- (a) 3-1-4-2
- (b) 1-3-4-2
- (c) 3-4-1-2
- (d) 1-3-2-4
Answer and explanation
(a) 3-1-4-2. Champakam (1951), Golaknath (1967), Kesavananda (1973), Minerva Mills (1980).
Q3. Match List I (Case) with List II (Principle):
| List I | List II |
|---|---|
| A. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) | 1. Harmony between Parts III and IV is basic structure |
| B. Minerva Mills (1980) | 2. Directive Principles run subsidiary to Fundamental Rights |
| C. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005) | 3. Not all private property is a “material resource of the community” |
| D. Property Owners Association (2024) | 4. Ban on slaughter of cow progeny is a reasonable restriction |
- (a) A-1, B-2, C-4, D-3
- (b) A-2, B-1, C-3, D-4
- (c) A-2, B-1, C-4, D-3
- (d) A-4, B-1, C-2, D-3
Answer and explanation
(c) A-2, B-1, C-4, D-3. Champakam placed DPSP below FR. Minerva Mills made balance between them part of the basic structure. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi used Art 48 to uphold a cattle slaughter ban under Art 19(6). Property Owners Association (2024) read Art 39(b) narrowly.
Q4. Which of the following is not a correct difference between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles?
- (a) Fundamental Rights are justiciable; Directive Principles are not.
- (b) Fundamental Rights aim at political democracy; Directive Principles at social and economic democracy.
- (c) Directive Principles are automatically enforceable; Fundamental Rights need legislation.
- (d) A law violating a Fundamental Right can be declared void; a law violating a Directive Principle cannot be struck down for that reason.
Answer and explanation
(c) reverses the truth. Fundamental Rights are largely self-executing, while Directive Principles need legislation before they take effect. The other three statements are correct.
Level 3: Mains Answer Writing
Q1. (60 words) What did the Supreme Court decide about Article 31C in Minerva Mills (1980)?
Model answer outline
- Intro: Art 31C (25th Amendment, 1971) protected laws under Art 39(b), (c) from challenge under Arts 14 and 19; the 42nd Amendment extended this to all directives.
- Body: Minerva Mills struck down the extension, holding that absolute primacy of Part IV would destroy Part III, and that harmony and balance between them is a basic feature.
- Conclusion: The original 31C survived, as the 2024 nine-judge bench confirmed.
Q2. (150–200 words) “Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are complementary, not conflicting.” Examine this statement with reference to judicial pronouncements.
Model answer outline
- Intro: Part III secures political liberty through justiciable rights; Part IV sets the goals of social and economic justice. Granville Austin called them together the “conscience of the Constitution”.
- Body:
- Early conflict: Champakam (1951) placed DPSP below FR; Golaknath (1967) barred amending FR to implement DPSP.
- Swing to DPSP: 25th Amendment (Art 31C, 1971) and 42nd Amendment (1976) tilted the balance towards Part IV.
- Synthesis: Kesavananda (1973) allowed amendment subject to the basic structure; Minerva Mills (1980) made balance between the Parts a basic feature.
- Complementarity in practice: DPSP read into Art 21 (legal aid, education, health, environment); DPSP used to judge reasonableness of restrictions (Mirzapur Moti Kureshi, 2005; Khoday Distilleries, 1995).
- Recent: Property Owners Association (2024) kept 31C but read Art 39(b) narrowly, protecting private property from blanket takeover.
- Chhattisgarh angle: tribal land protection (Art 46 with Art 19(5)) and the reservation litigation show the balance at work in the state.
- Conclusion: The settled position is harmonious construction: Part IV sets the ends and Part III limits the means.
Quick Revision Table
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Champakam Dorairajan | 1951; DPSP subsidiary to FR → 1st Amendment |
| Golaknath | 1967; FR cannot be amended → 24th Amendment (1971) |
| Art 31C | 25th Amendment (1971); laws for 39(b), (c) safe from Arts 14, 19 |
| Kesavananda Bharati | 1973; 13 judges, 7:6; basic structure; second part of 31C struck down |
| 42nd Amendment | 1976; 31C extended to all DPSP |
| Minerva Mills | 1980; extension struck down; harmony and balance is basic structure |
| Property Owners Association | 5 Nov 2024; 9 judges; 31C survives (unanimous); not all private property under 39(b) (8:1) |
| Mirzapur Moti Kureshi | 2005; Art 48 supports cattle slaughter ban under 19(6) |
| Randhir Singh | 1982; equal pay for equal work via 14, 16, 39(d) |
| Khoday Distilleries | 1995; no FR to trade in liquor (Art 47 context) |
Key Takeaways
Key Takeaways
- Part III is justiciable and negative; Part IV is non-justiciable and positive. Both are fundamental.
- The courts moved from FR supremacy (Champakam, Golaknath) through a DPSP tilt (25th and 42nd Amendments) to balance (Kesavananda, Minerva Mills).
- Art 31C today protects only laws under Art 39(b) and (c), and only against Arts 14 and 19.
- The 2024 nine-judge ruling confirmed 31C but held that not every private resource is a “material resource of the community”.
- Courts use directives to expand Art 21 and to judge the reasonableness of restrictions on Fundamental Rights.
What’s Next
- Fundamental Duties — Part IVA and how duties interact with rights
- DPSP and Fundamental Duties — Quick Revision
- Constitutional Remedies and Writs — why justiciability matters
- Judiciary — the Supreme Court benches behind these cases
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