Judicial Review, PIL and Judicial Activism
Judicial review in India, the basic structure cases from Golaknath to NJAC, PIL, and judicial activism vs restraint vs overreach, with Chhattisgarh examples.
Prerequisites
- Supreme Court: Jurisdiction and Powers — Arts 32, 136, 141 and 142, the tools of judicial review.
- Constitutional Remedies and Writs — the origin and landmark cases of PIL, summarised (not repeated) here.
- Preamble and Salient Features of the Constitution — judicial review and the basic structure as salient features.
The Hook: Special Police Officers in Bastar
In the late 2000s, young tribal men and women in Bastar were recruited as Special Police Officers (SPOs), given a few weeks of training and guns, and sent against Maoist insurgents. Sociologist Nandini Sundar and others petitioned the Supreme Court. On 5 July 2011, in Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, the Court held that using poorly trained tribal youth in counter-insurgency violated Articles 14 and 21, and ordered the practice stopped.
No law had been repealed by Parliament or the State Legislature. A court, acting on a petition from citizens who were not themselves victims, reviewed a state policy and struck it down. Is that the judiciary doing its job, or doing the government’s? This page gives you the vocabulary and the cases to answer that in Mains.
Why it matters: Prelims asks the basic structure cases in order and the articles that support judicial review. Mains asks “judicial activism vs judicial overreach” and “evaluate PIL” almost as standing questions.
Judicial Review (न्यायिक पुनरावलोकन)
Meaning: the power of the courts to examine whether laws, executive actions and constitutional amendments are consistent with the Constitution, and to declare them void (ultra vires) if they are not.
Origin: the doctrine was established in the USA in Marbury v. Madison (1803). The Indian Constitution does not use the phrase “judicial review”, but several articles give it a firm basis.
| Article | How it supports judicial review |
|---|---|
| 13 | Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of Fundamental Rights are void |
| 32, 226 | Writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts |
| 131–136 | Original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court |
| 143 | Advisory jurisdiction |
| 245, 246 | Legislative competence of Parliament and State Legislatures under the Seventh Schedule |
| 251, 254 | Union law prevails over State law in cases of inconsistency |
| 372 | Pre-Constitution laws continue only to the extent consistent with the Constitution |
Three grounds on which a law can be struck down:
- It violates Fundamental Rights (Part III).
- It is outside the competence of the legislature that made it (Seventh Schedule lists).
- It violates any other provision of the Constitution.
Judicial review of constitutional amendments: the basic structure story
timeline
title Amending power vs judicial review
1951 : Shankari Prasad - Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights
1967 : Golaknath (11 judges) - Fundamental Rights cannot be amended
1971 : 24th Amendment - Art 13(4), Art 368(3) restore power
1973 : Kesavananda Bharati (13 judges, 7-6) - amend anything but the basic structure
1975 : Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain - free and fair elections are basic structure
1976 : 42nd Amendment - Art 368(4) and (5) bar review of amendments
1980 : Minerva Mills - 368(4) and (5) struck down - judicial review and limited amending power are basic
2007 : I.R. Coelho (9 judges) - Ninth Schedule laws after 24 Apr 1973 open to review
2015 : NJAC case - judicial independence is basic structure| Case | Year | Point to remember |
|---|---|---|
| Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala | 1973 (24 April) | 13-judge bench, decided 7:6. Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot destroy its basic structure |
| Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain | 1975 | First application of the doctrine to strike down part of an amendment (39th); free and fair elections and rule of law are basic |
| Minerva Mills v. Union of India | 1980 | Struck down Art 368(4) and (5) (42nd Amendment). Limited amending power, judicial review and the balance between Fundamental Rights and DPSP are basic structure |
| Waman Rao v. Union of India | 1981 | Laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 (the Kesavananda date) can be tested against the basic structure |
| S.R. Bommai v. Union of India | 1994 | Secularism and federalism are basic structure; the President’s Rule proclamation under Art 356 is open to judicial review |
| L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India | 1997 | Judicial review by High Courts (Art 226) and the Supreme Court (Art 32) is basic structure; tribunals cannot exclude it |
| I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu | 2007 | 9-judge bench: Ninth Schedule laws added after 24 April 1973 can be struck down if they violate rights forming the basic structure |
| SC Advocates-on-Record Association (NJAC case) | 2015 | Independence of the judiciary is basic structure; 99th Amendment struck down |
Public Interest Litigation (जनहित याचिका): The Essentials
The full origin and evaluation of PIL are in Constitutional Remedies and Writs. The points this chapter adds:
| Point | Detail |
|---|---|
| What changed | The locus standi rule was relaxed: a public-spirited person can approach the court on behalf of those who cannot |
| Pioneers | Justices P.N. Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer, late 1970s and early 1980s |
| Forums | Supreme Court (Art 32) and High Courts (Art 226) |
| Landmarks | Hussainara Khatoon (1979); S.P. Gupta (1981, locus standi liberalised); Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) |
| Procedural innovations | Epistolary jurisdiction (letters treated as petitions); suo motu action on news reports; amicus curiae and court commissioners; continuing mandamus (the court keeps the case open and monitors compliance for years) |
| Safeguards against misuse | Courts check the petitioner’s bona fides, refuse “publicity” or private-interest petitions and impose costs. In State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) the Supreme Court issued guidelines to curb frivolous PILs |
Judicial Activism, Restraint and Overreach
Judicial activism (न्यायिक सक्रियता): a proactive role of the judiciary in protecting rights and enforcing accountability, going beyond the traditional role of only settling disputes between parties. The term is usually credited to the American historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1947). In India it grew after the Emergency, through PIL and the expansion of Art 21.
Judicial restraint: courts defer to the legislature and executive on matters of policy and do not substitute their own judgment. Example: in BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India (2002) the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the disinvestment policy, holding that economic policy is for the government.
Judicial overreach: activism that crosses into the legislative or executive domain, such as framing policy, running institutions or issuing directions without legal basis. The line between activism and overreach is contested, and that contest is the heart of most Mains questions.
Tools of judicial activism
graph LR
A["Judicial activism"] --> B["PIL and relaxed
locus standi"]
A --> C["Suo motu
cognisance"]
A --> D["Expansive reading
of Art 21"]
A --> E["Guidelines to
fill legislative gaps"]
A --> F["Continuing
mandamus"]
A --> G["Art 142
complete justice"]Landmark examples
| Case | Year | Activism shown |
|---|---|---|
| Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India | 1978 | Art 21 procedure must be fair, just and reasonable |
| Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation | 1985 | Right to livelihood within Art 21 |
| M.C. Mehta cases | 1986 onwards | Absolute liability (oleum gas leak, 1987); environmental directions, including CNG for Delhi’s public transport |
| T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India | 1996 onwards | “Forest” to be read in its dictionary meaning regardless of ownership; long-running continuing mandamus that shaped forest clearance and compensatory afforestation, highly relevant to forest-rich Chhattisgarh |
| Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan | 1997 | Guidelines on workplace sexual harassment, later replaced by the POSH Act, 2013 |
| D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal | 1997 | Guidelines on arrest and custody |
| Prakash Singh v. Union of India | 2006 | Directions on police reforms (State Security Commission, fixed tenure, separating investigation from law and order) |
| Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh | 2011 | Use of tribal SPOs in counter-insurgency violates Arts 14 and 21 |
| Lily Thomas v. Union of India | 2013 | Legislators convicted and sentenced to 2 years or more are disqualified immediately; Section 8(4) of the RP Act, 1951 struck down |
| PUCL v. Union of India | 2013 | NOTA option on ballots and EVMs |
| K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India | 2017 | Privacy a Fundamental Right (9 judges) |
| Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India | 2024 (15 February) | Electoral bonds scheme struck down as violating voters’ right to information under Art 19(1)(a) |
Examples critics call overreach
| Direction | Criticism |
|---|---|
| National anthem to be played in cinema halls before films (2016 interim order) | Policy-making by courts; the Court itself made it optional in 2018 |
| Ban on liquor sales within 500 metres of national and state highways (December 2016) | No statutory basis; heavy economic impact; later diluted for municipal areas |
| Courts appointing committees to run sports bodies or monitor executive functions in detail | Courts administering, not adjudicating |
| Striking down the NJAC (2015) | Critics argue the judiciary protected its own power over appointments against a unanimous Parliament and the state legislatures that ratified the amendment |
Evaluation for Mains
| Arguments for activism | Arguments against (or for restraint) |
|---|---|
| Fills the gap when the legislature and executive fail (Vishaka, police reforms) | Violates separation of powers; judges are not elected and not accountable to voters |
| Gives the voiceless access to justice (bonded labourers, undertrials, tribal citizens of Bastar) | Courts lack expertise and resources for policy (forests, economy, technology) |
| Protects the basic structure and Fundamental Rights | Directions are often poorly implemented; continuing mandamus can run for decades |
| Increases executive accountability and transparency (electoral bonds) | Adds to pendency; frivolous PILs crowd out ordinary litigants |
| Constitutionally grounded: Arts 13, 32, 142, 226 | Risk of “government by judiciary”; erodes legislative initiative |
Pendency and Judicial Reforms
- Well over 5 crore cases were pending across Indian courts in 2026, according to the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) and government replies in Parliament; most of them in district and subordinate courts, with roughly 64 lakh in High Courts.
- About 92,000 cases were pending in the Supreme Court on 1 January 2026, the reason given for raising its strength from 34 to 38 (Ordinance of May 2026, Act of August 2026).
| Reform | Status / idea |
|---|---|
| Filling vacancies, more judges | Supreme Court strength raised in 2019 and 2026; High Court vacancies persist |
| Technology | e-Courts Mission Mode Project, NJDG, virtual hearings and e-filing |
| Alternative dispute resolution | Lok Adalats, mediation (Mediation Act, 2023), arbitration |
| Rural access | Gram Nyayalayas (Act of 2008) |
| All India Judicial Service | Enabled by Art 312 (42nd Amendment, 1976); not yet created |
| Collegium transparency | Publishing reasons and criteria; time limits for recommendations and government approval |
| Fewer adjournments, case management | Procedural reform in the CPC and criminal procedure |
Memory Tricks
Don’t Confuse
| This | vs | That |
|---|---|---|
| Golaknath (1967): Fundamental Rights cannot be amended | vs | Kesavananda (1973): anything can be amended, except the basic structure |
| Minerva Mills (1980): struck down 368(4), (5) | vs | Waman Rao (1981): Ninth Schedule cut-off of 24 April 1973 |
| Waman Rao (1981): Ninth Schedule cut-off fixed | vs | I.R. Coelho (2007): 9 judges; post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws reviewable against basic structure |
| Judicial review: testing validity of laws and actions | vs | Judicial activism: a proactive approach in using that and other powers |
| Due process of law (USA) | vs | Procedure established by law (India, Art 21; widened by Maneka Gandhi) |
| PIL: anyone can file for others | vs | Private writ: the aggrieved person files for himself |
Common Mistakes
- “The term ‘judicial review’ appears in the Constitution.” False. The power is implied from Arts 13, 32, 226 and others.
- “Kesavananda Bharati was decided unanimously.” False. 7:6, by a 13-judge bench, the largest ever.
- “The basic structure doctrine was laid down in Golaknath.” False. Golaknath barred amendment of Fundamental Rights; the doctrine came in Kesavananda (1973).
- “Laws in the Ninth Schedule are completely immune from judicial review.” False. Laws added after 24 April 1973 can be tested against the basic structure (Waman Rao, I.R. Coelho).
- “Minerva Mills struck down the 24th Amendment.” False. It struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Art 368 added by the 42nd Amendment.
- “Judicial activism and judicial review mean the same thing.” False. Review is a power; activism is an approach to using power.
Practice
All questions below are original practice questions written in CGPSC style. They are not previous-year questions.
Level 1: Foundation
- The doctrine of judicial review was established in the USA in the case of ______ (1803).
- The basic structure doctrine was propounded by a ______-judge bench in Kesavananda Bharati (1973).
- The option of NOTA on ballots was introduced following the Supreme Court’s 2013 judgment in ______ v. Union of India.
Answers
- Marbury v. Madison.
- 13-judge bench (decided 7:6).
- PUCL (People’s Union for Civil Liberties).
Level 2: Prelims MCQs
Q1. Consider the following statements:
- The expression “judicial review” is expressly used in Article 13 of the Constitution.
- In Minerva Mills (1980), the Supreme Court held that judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
- In I.R. Coelho (2007), the Supreme Court held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 can be tested against the basic structure.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
- (a) 1 and 2 only
- (b) 2 only
- (c) 2 and 3 only
- (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer and explanation
Q2. Match List I (Case) with List II (Outcome):
| List I | List II |
|---|---|
| A. Golaknath (1967) | 1. Secularism and federalism are basic features |
| B. Kesavananda Bharati (1973) | 2. Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights |
| C. S.R. Bommai (1994) | 3. Basic structure doctrine propounded |
| D. L. Chandra Kumar (1997) | 4. Judicial review under Arts 32 and 226 is basic structure |
- (a) A-2, B-3, C-4, D-1
- (b) A-3, B-2, C-1, D-4
- (c) A-2, B-3, C-1, D-4
- (d) A-2, B-1, C-3, D-4
Answer and explanation
Q3. In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court hold that the use of tribal youth as Special Police Officers in counter-insurgency operations in Chhattisgarh was unconstitutional?
- (a) Prakash Singh v. Union of India
- (b) Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh
- (c) T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India
- (d) D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
Answer and explanation
Q4. Which one of the following is not usually regarded as a feature of Public Interest Litigation in India?
- (a) Relaxation of the rule of locus standi
- (b) Treating letters addressed to judges as writ petitions
- (c) Continuing mandamus to monitor compliance
- (d) A strictly adversarial procedure in which only the parties lead evidence
Answer and explanation
Q5. The Supreme Court’s 2024 judgment in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India is associated with:
- (a) Introduction of the NOTA option
- (b) Disqualification of convicted legislators
- (c) Striking down the electoral bonds scheme
- (d) Police reforms
Answer and explanation
Level 3: Mains Answer Writing
Q1. (60 words) What is the doctrine of basic structure? Name any four features recognised as part of it.
Model answer outline
- Definition: propounded in Kesavananda Bharati (1973, 13 judges, 7:6): Parliament’s power under Art 368 can amend any part of the Constitution but cannot destroy its basic structure.
- Features: supremacy of the Constitution; judicial review (Minerva Mills, 1980); secularism and federalism (S.R. Bommai, 1994); independence of the judiciary (NJAC case, 2015); free and fair elections.
- One line: the list is judge-made and open-ended.
Q2. (150–200 words) “The line between judicial activism and judicial overreach is thin.” Discuss with examples.
Model answer outline
- Intro: Activism is a proactive use of judicial power to protect rights and secure accountability; overreach is its excess into legislative and executive domains.
- Activism as necessity:
- Executive and legislative inaction: Vishaka (1997), D.K. Basu (1997), Prakash Singh (2006).
- Voice for the voiceless: Hussainara Khatoon, Bandhua Mukti Morcha; Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011) protecting tribal youth in Bastar.
- Democratic integrity: Lily Thomas, NOTA (2013), electoral bonds (2024).
- Overreach concerns: national anthem order (2016, made optional 2018); highway liquor ban (2016); detailed policy and administrative directions; NJAC verdict criticised as self-serving. Separation of powers, lack of expertise, weak implementation, pendency.
- Chhattisgarh angle: the long-running Godavarman forest case shaped forest clearances and compensatory afforestation in a state with over 40% forest cover; it shows both the benefits and the administrative burden of continuing mandamus.
- Way forward: the “fill the gap, don’t take the seat” test; judicial restraint in policy; strong legislatures that do not leave vacuums.
- Conclusion: Activism is legitimate when it enforces the Constitution and fades when the other organs act; it becomes overreach when it substitutes for them.
Quick Revision Table
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Judicial review: origin | Marbury v. Madison (USA, 1803) |
| Indian basis | Arts 13, 32, 131–136, 143, 226, 227, 245, 246, 251, 254, 372 (term not used) |
| Grounds | Fundamental Rights violation; lack of legislative competence; other constitutional violation |
| Golaknath | 1967; 11 judges; Fundamental Rights unamendable |
| Kesavananda Bharati | 24 April 1973; 13 judges; 7:6; basic structure |
| Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain | 1975; free and fair elections |
| Minerva Mills | 1980; 368(4),(5) struck; judicial review, limited amending power |
| Waman Rao | 1981; Ninth Schedule cut-off 24 April 1973 |
| S.R. Bommai | 1994; secularism, federalism; Art 356 reviewable |
| L. Chandra Kumar | 1997; review under 32 and 226 basic |
| I.R. Coelho | 2007; 9 judges; post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws reviewable |
| PIL pioneers | Bhagwati, Krishna Iyer; guidelines in Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) |
| “Judicial activism” | Term credited to Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1947) |
| CG case | Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 5 July 2011 (SPOs; Arts 14, 21) |
| Godavarman | 1996 onwards; dictionary meaning of “forest”; continuing mandamus |
| Restraint example | BALCO (2002): economic policy for the government |
| Pendency (2026) | Well over 5 crore across courts; ~92,000 in SC on 1 Jan 2026 |
Key Takeaways
- Judicial review is implied, not named, in the Constitution; Arts 13, 32 and 226 are its pillars.
- Kesavananda Bharati (1973) set the basic structure limit; Minerva Mills (1980) made judicial review itself part of it; I.R. Coelho (2007) opened post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws to review.
- PIL relaxed locus standi and gave the voiceless access to courts, but needs safeguards against misuse.
- Activism fills gaps; overreach takes over the other organs’ roles; restraint defers on policy. Mains answers should weigh all three.
- Nandini Sundar (2011) and Godavarman show judicial activism at work in Chhattisgarh.
What’s Next
- Judiciary — Quick Revision — the whole chapter on one page
- State Executive and Legislature — the next chapter, on the organs whose actions the courts review
- Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties — the FR-DPSP balance held to be basic structure in Minerva Mills
- Forests, Wildlife, National Parks and Sanctuaries — the Chhattisgarh forests touched by the Godavarman case